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FOREWORD
“Surprise” is a familiar term in military writings:
the achievement of tactical surprise has such obvious
benefits that it is enshrined in the military doctrine of
most nations. Surprises that emerge in tactics, however, can also operate at the strategic and operational
levels. These surprises are particularly dangerous,
because they can test the relevance and adaptability
of military forces and the “institutional” defense establishments that create, develop, and sustain them.
A military establishment that is too slow to recognize
and respond to such surprises places its nation’s interests at grave risk. In the bipolar strategic environment of the Cold War, deep knowledge of a known
adversary reduced the likelihood of such surprises.
The same is not true now. This monograph thus
comes at an important time, as Western nations contemplate major reductions in defense spending with
consequent limitations on force structure. The range
of enemy capabilities that a force will be able to match,
qualitatively and quantitatively, will become smaller;
hence the potential for operational and strategic surprise will increase.
In this monograph, Brigadier Andrew Smith uses
the improvised explosive device threat as it manifested itself in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 as a case study
of such a surprise and how defense establishments
responded to it. He argues that, although tactical in
itself, this threat posed an operational and strategic
threat in a modern “war of discretion” that demanded institutional responses from both the U.S. and
Australian institutional militaries, including major
equipment, training, and budgetary changes within
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time frames that circumvented the normal peacetime
force development cycles of those countries. There are
disappointments in the way both countries met this
challenge. A key conclusion from this analysis is the
critical role of strategic leadership in recognizing the
scale of surprise and in forcing the necessary institutional response. At a time when budgets will not allow surprise to be addressed by maintaining large and
technically diverse forces at high readiness, the ability
to recognize and respond adroitly to operational and
strategic surprise may be a critical requirement for a
modern defense establishment.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional
militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise
with operational—if not strategic—implications.
Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many
countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from
strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and
the necessary responses are distinct from the military
adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience
from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of
surprise and response, of which the most significant
part is the institutional response. A case study of this
experience illustrates how conventional military establishments recognize and respond to such surprises,
with a particular focus on the experience, respectively,
of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments.
This case study reveals that institutional response is
triggered by recognition of the surprise, which then
cues organizational, equipment, training and doctrine, research and development, industrial, funding/
budgetary, and policy actions.
Because the IED problem has mostly been a phenomenon of the land environment, this examination
tends to emphasize the responses of armies, but the
lessons have more general application. This paper contends that both the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
and the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) could
have responded quicker than they did: contemporary
defense establishments, it seems, may not cope well
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with such surprises. Despite this, the DoD demonstrated impressive agility in its response, especially
for such a large organization, while the ADO was curiously slow to make the necessary institutional adaptations. In both cases, the role of senior leadership was
key to mobilizing an effective response. In a fiscally
constrained future that lacks the certainty of bipolar,
state-on-state threats, the ability to recognize and respond quickly to operational and strategic surprise
may be the decisive characteristic of national defense
establishments.
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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN IRAQ,
2003-09:
A CASE OF OPERATIONAL SURPRISE
AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, nations have found themselves confronted with unexpected threats that place
them at a fatal military disadvantage. These situations
are an extension of the more general military notion
of surprise—a familiar military term that is enshrined
as a principle of war in the military doctrine of many
countries.1 Sometimes the source of these surprises is
the application of a completely new technology; more
often, it is a change in tactics or behavior. German
submarine operations in World War I and World War
II are an example. Even in World War I, submarines
were not new and Germany’s possession of them not
a secret, but their use in the Atlantic shipping lanes
threatened the Allies’ strategic supply lines and their
ability to sustain a war effort.2
To avoid defeat, agile responses are needed to negate the disadvantage imposed by a new threat or capability. Returning to the example of the World War
II Atlantic submarine menace, this involved the adoption of escorted convoy tactics,3 increases to aerial
maritime patrol coverage, improvements to detection
technologies such as sonar and radar, the development
of the acoustic homing torpedo, and the increased capacity of the shipbuilding industry to compensate for
losses.4 Significantly, not all of these responses were
purely military: industrial mobilization, for example,
could be considered a national response.
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Nations and their military establishments have
shown differing levels of agility in responding to
these surprises. Before an entity can respond, however, it must recognize that it has been surprised; that
is, it must understand that familiar capabilities and accustomed reactions may not secure success. With that
realization, the entity can begin to address the challenges of deciding how to respond, and of organizing
and executing that response.
Nations use their military power for political reasons. In democracies, government decisions to commit and sustain military forces depend on judgments
that, among other things, their employment has sufficient popular support. This is particularly important
in wars of discretion—those conflicts in which governments have some choice in whether, and to what
extent, they become and remain involved.5 In such
conflicts, popular support can be a volatile commodity and may decline if the population believes that
the cost of military involvement is too great for the
benefits in prospect, especially in terms of casualties,
or that a costly commitment is dragging on without a
reasonable prospect of successful resolution. If a lack
of popular support, and consequently of political will,
leads to the withdrawal of military forces before a conflict is satisfactorily won, the outcome could amount
to strategic defeat without suffering decisive tactical defeat. High casualties and long duration could
therefore constitute a defeat-threshold for a modern
military, especially one wielded by a democracy, by
prompting decisions to terminate its involvement in a
conflict.6 If this proposition is accepted, then it follows
that military surprises can threaten strategic defeat
if they cannot be overcome before they cause casualties above or prolong a military commitment beyond
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the national tolerance for those things. The ability to
respond to surprises in an agile and effective way is
always critical to military success. In an environment
in which political support for military commitment is
fragile, that ability takes on a special importance for
modern democracies.
This Letort Paper argues that the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being
confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—
if not strategic—implications, necessitating “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat. The manuscript contends that this 6-year evolution, from 2003
until 2009, constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and
response. A case study of this experience illustrates
how conventional military establishments recognize
and respond to such surprises, with a particular focus
on the experience, respectively, of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments. Because the IED problem manifests itself mostly in the land environment,
that examination tends to emphasize the responses of
armies, but the lessons have a more general application. The paper will contend that both the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Australian Defence
Organisation (ADO) could have responded quicker
than they did. Despite this, the DoD demonstrated
impressive agility in its response, especially for such a
large organization, while the ADO was slower to begin making the institutional adaptations it eventually
found necessary.
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OPERATIONAL SURPRISE AND RESPONSE
Surprise is a familiar concept in the theory of
warfare. Achieving it is set as a key objective in most
countries’ doctrines. “It [surprise] lies more or less
at the foundation of all undertakings. . . .”7 Surprise
is seen most frequently at the tactical level, but operational and strategic surprises also occur. Recent
writings have posited a similar concept of strategicshock to describe an unanticipated turn of events that
renders previous strategic planning obsolete or irrelevant: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941
and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11)
are examples of these events.8 Determining the level
of surprise (tactical, operational, or strategic), or the
demarcation between surprise and shock, could be
the subject of its own debate: for the purposes of this
paper, surprise is considered to function at the level at
which it compels a response. Tactical surprise has tactical consequences and necessitates a tactical response
that is within the remit of the tactical commander.9
Operational surprise threatens operational vulnerabilities and requires a response beyond the resources
of the tactical commander. Operational responses can
include a redistribution of forces within the theater,
the release and employment of theater reserves, and
other decisions within the remit of the operational
commander. They may also necessitate reaching back
into strategic resources and capabilities. In the latter
situations, surprise begins to impinge on the strategic
level, requiring a strategic response.
A surprise and its successful response constitute
a cycle that begins when the surprise emerges, putting the surprised force at a disadvantage by negating
some aspect of its capability. The cycle continues as
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the surprised force responds: if it does so successfully,
it nullifies that disadvantage and regains its previous
relative capability. At the operational and strategic
levels, the response itself is a complex activity that
consists of:
• Recognition, whereby the surprised force becomes aware that it has been surprised and
must devise a response.
• Tactical response, by which tactical commanders respond as best they can with the means
available to them. The impact of surprise will
tend to be obvious at the tactical level, and any
competent tactical commander will attempt to
respond. For this reason, tactical responses are
not analyzed deeply here.
• Institutional response, which engages (potentially) the full resources of the national military organization to respond comprehensively.
This can involve a partial transformation of the
force. Elements of the institutional response include:
— Organization. This can include changes to
force structure, such as the establishment of
new units or agencies.
— Equipment. This includes the identification
and supply of different equipment to support
new capabilities.
— Training and doctrine. At the institutional
level, this involves developing new training
and doctrine to address the threat posed by
the surprise and delivering this systematically
through the routine “raise, train, and, sustain”
process of the national defense apparatus. This
is particularly important when the threat posed
by the surprise is assessed to be an enduring
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—
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—

—

feature of the security environment rather than
an aberration.
Research and development (R&D). National
R&D capacity may need to be engaged to develop technological solutions to surprises, or to
conduct the operational analysis (OA) needed
to devise improved tactics, techniques, and
procedures.
Industry. Manufacture of unanticipated quantities of special equipment or of consumable
supplies may require the development of new
industrial capacity or the direction of existing
capacity contrary to normal market influences.
Funding. The allocation of unobligated funding may be necessary to support the response
elements identified above, especially for such
equipment acquisitions and operating costs.
Policy. All of the foregoing can constitute a policy response if their implementation involves
a de facto departure from existing policy. This
response may be stated explicitly in published
policy pronouncements, or it can be implicit in
the redirection of force structure, equipment, or
funding priorities. In the latter situation a policy
response might evolve incrementally, through
a series of pragmatic management decisions by
military leaders, defense officials, and industry
leaders, rather than through a single conscious
decision of a government.

THE CONTEMPORARY IED EXPERIENCE
IEDs are not new. The use of unattended explosive
devices of one sort or another was a common feature
of 20th century warfare. Terrorist bombs have been
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a reality since the 17th century.10 IEDs have been a
particular feature of insurgencies since the mid-20th
century.11 Landmines were a standard feature of conventional warfare, in both practice and doctrine, from
World War II until an arms limitation process began
in the 1990s.12 The British, U.S., and Australian Armies
confronted these explosive hazards, in the form of nuisance landmines,13 booby traps, and true IEDs, in their
operational experiences of Vietnam and Northern Ireland from the 1960s. More recently, British and U.S.
forces encountered minefields in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, while Australia contributed military
experts to humanitarian demining efforts in various
parts of the world consistently since the late-1980s.14
Modern militaries that did not face these threats directly had full visibility of their existence and their effects on other countries’ forces.
In the years leading up to the 2003 Iraq War, Western military establishments began to acknowledge a
probable shift in the nature of the conflicts they would
encounter in the future, and a need to adapt in anticipation of that shift. Debate in professional journals
began to recognize the impact of factors such as urbanization, the rise of nonstate actors and the dominance of the United States and its wealthier Western
allies in conventional military operations. Well before
the emergence of the dangerous insurgencies in Iraq
and Afghanistan, military thinkers expected adversaries on future battlefields to present asymmetric
threats that would negate that dominance.15 Despite
this apparent intellectual readiness to accept that new
problems might be lurking, as well as experience that
showed that things like IEDs were within the repertoire of potential adversaries, neither the U.S., Australian, nor United Kingdom (UK) militaries commenced
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operations in Iraq in 2003 with a mature counter-IED
(CIED) capability; nor, apparently, did they anticipate
the emergence of a significant IED threat. In the U.S.
case, this has been criticized formally:
DoD was aware of the threat posed by mines and
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in low-intensity
conflicts and of the availability of mine-resistant vehicles years before insurgent actions began in Iraq in
2003. Yet DoD did not develop requirements for, fund,
or acquire MRAP (mine resistant ambush-protected)type vehicles for low-intensity conflicts that involved
mines and IEDs. As a result, the Department entered
into operations in Iraq without having taken available
steps to acquire technology to mitigate the known
mine and IED risk to soldiers and Marines.16

DATA SOURCES
For sound reasons of operational security, most
national defense organizations limit the public release
of information on current operations. This complicates
open-source research into emerging operational phenomena, such as the contemporary IED experience.
Key sources of data on IED casualties are U.S. DoD
media releases.17 These announce fatalities among personnel assigned to operations, including, in most cases, the cause of death. These data have been collected
and processed for Iraq for the period May 1, 2003, the
end of major combat operations, until June 30, 2008.
This data set provides attributable information on the
cause of U.S. fatalities, but has certain limitations that
must be acknowledged:
• It is limited to U.S. DoD personnel and does
not include contractors or personnel from other
Coalition countries.
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• It relates to fatalities only: details of nonfatal
casualties are not disclosed. Conclusions about
the effectiveness of IEDs and countermeasures
could therefore be distorted if fatalities are not
proportional to nonfatal incidents.
• The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) stopped disclosing the cause of death of its combat fatalities in 2004.18 USMC IED fatalities in Iraq are,
therefore, underreported from that point on,
introducing unreliability in the data if those
fatalities are not proportional to those suffered
by the other U.S. services.
The restriction of the Defenselink data to U.S. fatalities only is not a significant defect for the purposes
of this paper, which examines only U.S. and Australian behavior specifically, and good data are available
on fatalities from Australia.19 Finally, the reliability of
the Defenselink figures is supported by the fact that
they are generally consistent with summary statistics
available occasionally from official sources, such as
Congressional Research Service reports,20 and detailed
statistics available from unofficial sources, such as the
“Iraq Coalition Casualty Count.”21 Other data sources
include statements by officials, reported in the media
or in U.S. and Australian government media releases
and transcripts, and governmental reports, such as
Congressional or Parliamentary Committee proceedings.
U.S. EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ
President George W. Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” declaration on board the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, has come to symbolize the end
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of the shock-and-awe maneuver phase of the current
Iraq conflict, in which the forces of the United States
and its allies enjoyed a swift and predictable victory
against the conventional forces of Iraq, suffering relatively few casualties.22 The insurgency that was to
develop in the succeeding months, however, would
soon cause a steady climb in the U.S. casualty toll
and belie the “Mission Accomplished” assertion. The
United States has maintained over 100,000 personnel
on the ground in Iraq (who are therefore subject to IED
hazards) through early 2010. The unquestioned U.S.
leadership role in the Coalition in Iraq, combined with
the administration’s political equities in that conflict,
effectively limited its discretion in the size of its commitment, or in the degree of risk it must accept—as the
Coalition leaders, U.S. forces had to do the business in
Iraq, and were therefore exposed to adversaries’ offensive tactics.
The first reported U.S. IED fatality in Iraq after
“Mission Accomplished” occurred on June 28, 2003.23
The monthly total of IED fatalities climbed steadily
from then. In August and September 2003, IEDs were
responsible for more U.S. combat fatalities than the
combined totals for direct fire weapons (small arms
and rocket-propelled grenades [RPGs]) and indirect
fire, the methods that had, historically, caused the
majority of battle casualties. Figure 1 illustrates the
increase in IED fatalities and the reversal in fatality
cause trends that occurred over this period (that is,
IEDs went from a minor to the major cause of fatalities). By late-2003, monthly IED fatalities were double
those of direct and indirect fire weapons. To adapt the
language of epidemiology, this period (October 2003)
can be identified as the index event of the IED surprise: that is, the point at which it is possible to prove
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empirically that a new phenomenon is at work on the
battlefield, and from which the development of, and
response to, that phenomenon can be measured.24
When monthly U.S. IED fatalities are charted out
over the entire sample period (until June 2008), IED
fatalities are seen to continue to increase over the next
year, with significant spikes associated with major
insurgent offensives up until 2007 (Figure 2).25 From
late-2007, U.S. IED fatalities began a sustained decline
until, by mid-2008, monthly totals had returned to
mid-2003 levels. Over the course of this evolution, the
IED threat exposed a number of gaps in the capabilities
of Coalition forces in Iraq, ranging from intelligence
processes, through detection methods and protective
technologies, to the medical capacity to treat injuries.26

Figure 1. U.S. Battle Fatalities in Iraq by Cause,
May-December 2003.27
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Figure 2. Monthly U.S. IED Fatalities in Iraq, May
2003-September 2008.28
One of the most significant aspects of the growth
in U.S. IED fatalities in Iraq is that it was incurred over
a sustained period by a military that was, by most
quantitative and qualitative measures, among the best
in the world. Despite this superiority, the U.S. Defense establishment, collectively, took years to bring
the threat under control. This fact is perhaps the most
stunning evidence of the level of surprise involved.29
The above-mentioned point notwithstanding, before drawing any conclusions about the effectiveness
of U.S. CIED measures as a reason for the eventual
decline in IED fatalities, it must be acknowledged that
IEDs were a weapon employed in the context of an
insurgency. Consequently, variations in IED incident
rates, and hence fatalities, can be attributed to changes
in the intensity of the insurgency overall and the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts
generally, as well as changes in the effectiveness of
CIED measures specifically. Changes in capability and
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) designed
to work across all aspects of the insurgency (such as

12

improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] capacity and better intelligence fusion),
would be expected to yield significant results against
its weapon of choice.
THE U.S. RESPONSE
Recognition.
The U.S. response to the new IED problem in Iraq
began quickly. The propensity of tactical commanders to recognize and respond quickly to new threats,
within their means, was demonstrated and will not be
discussed further.30 Recognition at higher levels also
came early. Evidence of this is found in the emphatic
language used by Commander of U.S. Central Command General John Abizaid in a memorandum sent
to his strategic superiors (Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Richard Myers) in October 2003. Abizaid
described a need for a “Manhattan-like project” to
address the IED problem.31 The comparison with the
Manhattan Project is significant: the U.S. project to develop a useful nuclear weapon in World War II is a
benchmark for scale, cost, complexity, and urgency in
a military undertaking, one that needed to harness the
full depth of the U.S. scientific and industrial capacity.32 Clearly, Abizaid saw in the IED problem a surprise of strategic proportions.
Institutional Response.
The U.S. Defense establishment’s response to Abizaid’s request is evidence of recognition, at the strategic level, of a significant new problem needing an
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institutional response. As that response evolved, it
demonstrated all the elements noted above.
Organizational.
The DoD’s initial response was organizational:
the immediate formation by the U.S. Army of an ad
hoc task force of 12 personnel (an organization—the
Army IED Task Force), located in Washington, DC, to
study and attempt to address the IED problem.33 This
response was repeated over the ensuing years as the
IED problem grew. In July 2004, the Army Task Force
was upgraded to a Joint Integrated Process team (under Army leadership), moving the IED response into
the Joint arena.34 In June 2005, the U.S. CIED apparatus was upgraded again into the Joint IED Defeat Task
Force (JIEDD TF), under a specific DoD Directive, to
further improve coordination of the DoD’s efforts.35
The status of the JIEDD TF was further elevated in December 2005 by the appointment of retired four-star
General Montgomery “Monty” Meigs as its Director.36
Meigs’ selection was significant in its own right. Some
years previously, he had published a treatise on the
scientific response to the submarine threats of World
War II, in which he explained the evolution of a solution that, he concluded, consisted of optimized equipment and doctrine developed by close cooperation between the R&D community and operators.37 With this
background, Meigs brought with him a sophisticated
understanding of how urgent capability development
efforts need to be coordinated.38 The JIEDD TF’s title
was upgraded to the Joint IED Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) in January 2006 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England,39 and finally the new Organization was codified by the issue of a specific Direc-
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tive in February of that year.40 This entire evolution,
from the first U.S. IED fatality to the establishment of
a statutory organization under four-star leadership,
had taken 2.5 years (a few months less from the “index
event” of October 2003).
Figure 3 maps these major milestones in the development of the U.S. CIED apparatus against fatality
figures over time. This indicates a correlation between
significant spikes in fatalities and progressive escalations in the resourcing and profile of CIED efforts.
Figure 3 suggests that the U.S. Defense establishment
was highly responsive to indications of a worsening
problem and increased efforts to address it until it was
brought under satisfactory control.

Figure 3. Selected U.S. and Australian Institutional
Responses.
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Another level of organizational response to the
IED surprise is reflected in the U.S. Army Engineer
Branch’s adoption of a modular force structure approach in the period 2005-08.41 The Modular Engineer
Force had been under development for some time, but
the emergence of the IED threat led to the inclusion
of specific unit roles and structures, in particular the
Route Clearance Company, with specialized equipment and a focus on clearing IEDs and other explosive hazards from roads and infrastructure. Activation of these units was accelerated in response to the
IED threat, with several being raised by mid-2006.42
Measured from the index event in late-2003, this represents an organizational and force structure response
cycle of less than 3 years.
Equipment.
At the operational and strategic levels, the U.S.
equipment response to the IED surprise in Iraq was
broad, ranging from improved body armor for personnel to quantitative and qualitative improvements
in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities. The greatest emphasis was in the areas of
physical protection against IED effects, especially in
the form of protected vehicles, and in prevention of
IED detonations through the use of specialized electronic countermeasures (ECM). The need to make significant acquisitions of new equipment, much of it not
previously held in DoD inventories, supports the contention that the DoD was surprised by the emergence
of the IED threat.
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Vehicles.
Almost from the beginning of the Iraqi IED problem, media reports characterized the devices as
roadside bombs because of their use predominantly
against Coalition vehicles. An early response to the
problem was to employ vehicles with armored protection to increase personnel survivability against IED effects. This was particularly necessary for soft-skinned
general purpose vehicles, in which the majority of
movement was undertaken and which are essential
for the efficient conduct of routine functions such as
personnel transportation, administrative movement,
and logistic resupply. Initially, U.S. forces in Iraq had
few general purpose vehicles with armored protection
and even fewer vehicles that were optimized for the
conduct of CIED activities.
Initial efforts to increase the number of protected
vehicles available were, in effect, a tactical response,
whereby deployed units improvised so-called hillbilly armor onto their vehicles using whatever methods were available.43 Official attempts to increase the
number of protected vehicles resorted to existing
solutions for the most common soft-skinned vehicle,
the ubiquitous high-mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicle (HMMWV). The requirement for significant
numbers of additional protected vehicles, as well as
add-on armor kits (Armor Survivability Kits [ASKs])
to provide protection for existing HMMWVs, was
passed by U.S. Central Command to the DoD in late2003. In response, the U.S. Army initiated contracts to
produce additional vehicles and ASKs, which began
to flow into the theater in November 2003.44 Demands
for protected vehicles continued to emanate from the
theater over the following years. By July 2005, Cen-
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tral Command’s requirement for 9,727 up-armored
HMMWVs for Iraq had been met.45 In all, a total of
30,000 additional protected HMMWVs (either factorybuilt or fitted with ASKs) are now available to the U.S.
Armed Forces.46
Even when armored, however, the protection offered by the HMMWV was inadequate and a need for
a better protected vehicle was soon identified. This
was prompted, in part, by the appearance of a more
lethal type of IED in Iraq, using explosively formed
projectile (EFP) technology.47 Deployed forces made
an initial request for 1,169 vehicles in June 2005. The
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle
program was initiated in November 2006 to provide
a solution to this requirement.48 MRAP orders increased, progressively, to more than 25,000, of which
15,000 had been delivered into the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters by January 2010, at a cost of over U.S.
$22 billion.49 An unprecedented personal focus from
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates since May 2007 has
seen the program expanded and enormous priority
given to funding, procuring, and delivering the vehicles to troops.50 The MRAP fleet now encompasses
5 vehicle types, including a lighter-weight variant, the
MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (MATV), to meet mobility
requirements identified through operational experience in Afghanistan.51
An interesting illustration of the surprise that the
IED problem presented the United States from an
equipment perspective is presented by the Interim
Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detection (IVMMD) Project.
This was a small project initiated in the late-1990s to
provide an interim capability for U.S. Army combat
engineers to deal with mine threats along routes.52 The
equipment solution eventually devised consisted of
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a set of specialist vehicles, of South African design,
capable of deploying detection technologies along
a road, and dealing with any mines detected, from
within vehicles that would provide the operators with
excellent protection against explosive effects. As the
name implies, the project was intended to provide an
interim capability, involving a small fleet of only 10
systems, awaiting the development of a more permanent capability as part of the U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) project.53 Ironically, by late-2003, the
FCS requirement (intended to replace, eventually, all
combat vehicles in the U.S. Army) did not include a
capability like the IVMMD, making the latter an orphan legacy capability that was limited to the initial
tiny fleet.54 The U.S. Army’s deliberate capability development process, in other words, did not anticipate
a threat of the sort that IVMMD was meant to address;
at least, it did not see any urgency in the need to counter such a threat. The IVMMD fleet was deployed to
Iraq in late-2003 in response to an operational requirement emanating from the theater as a result of the
growing IED threat along routes (roadside bombs).
Although not optimized for dealing with IEDs (it was
a countermine system), this use of the IVMMD was an
example of the deployment of the closest thing available to deal with a surprise.55
The MRAP solution demonstrates one characteristic that recurs across other aspects of the IED response:
it is not new. The key element of the solution—the vehicles’ v-shaped hull, designed to dissipate explosive
forces before they penetrate the crew space—was well
known, having been developed to a high state of maturity by the South Africans more than 20 years before.56 A number of vehicles with this design feature
were commercially available prior to 2003, and were
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even represented in the IVMMD fleet. Any assessment
of the adequacy of U.S. responsiveness in adopting
this solution must take account of this fact.
A prominent feature of the MRAP program is the
personal involvement of Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates. Shortly after assuming office in December 2006,
Gates interceded to accelerate the program massively,
directing that, “the MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department of Defense acquisition program” and creating special management
arrangements for it.57 He has remained engaged with
the project ever since and has been a driving force behind not only the procurement of the vehicles, but their
rushed delivery into the field. Gates has directed unprecedented efforts to get the new equipment to users
in theater rapidly, including the employment of scarce
and expensive air transport to move vehicles virtually
directly from manufacturing facilities to operational
areas. Gates’s background is significant: as a civilian
and a newcomer to the most senior executive role in
DoD, he had few equities in the established response.
More importantly, recently he had been a member of
President Bush’s Iraq Study Group, which undertook
a review of the U.S. campaign in Iraq. He therefore
came with an independent but well-informed perspective, which should have enabled him to recognize
the strategic vulnerability exposed by the IED problem and the urgency of addressing it.58 It is possible
that, through his experience in the Iraq Study Group,
he brought an agenda in relation to Iraq, which may
have included the CIED problem.
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Electronic Countermeasures.
Most countries tend to group ECM among the
highly classified capabilities referred to, collectively,
as electronic warfare (EW). In the emerging jargon for
this equipment, one acronym encountered frequently
is CREW (counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare). 59 Because of its high classification level, opensource data on the acquisition and fielding of CREW
equipment in response to the IED threat is sparse.
There is evidence, however, that the United States has
made major investments in this equipment and in organizational and doctrinal structures needed to keep
its complex programming up to date with the rapidly
changing electronic environment.60 The scale and pace
of the U.S. response is indicated by the rate of generational change in the equipment solutions used, the
first being early Warlock systems procured under the
CREW-1 specification, which were fielded in Iraq before the end of 2003.61 This had evolved to the CREW
2.1 (second generation) specification by mid-2007,
with that equipment entering service in Iraq by April
2008. This represents a complete cycle from first- to
second-generation equipment fleets, with associated
supporting capabilities, of 5 years. This represents
rapid progress when compared with the priority that
the U.S. Army had applied historically to ground EW
equipment in peacetime procurement.62 Operational
effectiveness of CREW systems in Iraq reveals a similarly impressive achievement, with the proportion of
U.S. casualties caused by radio-controlled IEDs declining significantly over an 18-month period from
mid-2006 until late-2007.63
Like the MRAPs’ V-shaped hulls, the concept of
ECM as a counter-IED capability was not new. British
forces had been employing it in Northern Ireland for
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almost 20 years, and the U.S. Navy had possessed a
limited capability, called Acorn, since the 1990s . In
fact, a number of Acorn systems were deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 in response to the early emergence
of RCIEDs there.64
Training and Doctrine.
U.S. forces began to modify training in response
to IEDs and explosive hazards in Iraq well before the
end of 2003. Units encountering the IED hazard in theater began to adapt their own TTPs, an example of the
tactical response that would be expected of units in
contact. This effort was reinforced at the tactical level
by adapting an existing structure that was already
available—the Mine and Explosive Ordnance Information Coordination Center (MEOICC) that had deployed as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).65
The MEOICC’s initial deployment was a normal,
doctrinal measure to address the hazards from explosive remnants of war (ERW), usually in the form of
landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs), that are
encountered after conventional military operations.
The MEOICC’s Explosive Hazard Awareness Team
(EHAT) evolved over the course of its deployment,
gradually increasing its emphasis on IEDs.
Institutional training responses were first demonstrated by modifications to training for deploying elements—in the first instance, this involved
the use of training developed by the EHAT in Iraq,
which by early-2004 began to make its way into predeployment training delivered in the United States
for units deploying as part of the OIF-2 rotation.66
Further training, in dedicated IED training lanes, was
also delivered to units arriving in the theater as part

22

of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration processes. Formal changes to doctrine and to the
structure of the U.S. Army’s training establishments
took a little longer, but had begun to emerge in 2004.
For example, the U.S. Army Engineer School’s Counter Mine/Counter Booby-Trap Center, itself created
only in January 2002, was renamed the Counter Explosive Hazards Center in early-2004, in response to
the new IED threat.67 Reflecting the energetic debate
on professional issues normal in the U.S. military, articles on the IED threat and responses to it also began
to proliferate in U.S. military journals from early-2004.
The doctrinal response also began in 2003, with the
establishment of the Asymmetric Warfare Group, an
Army initiative, to study emerging aspects of the insurgency. Doctrine also began to be overhauled from
2004, with doctrinal structural arrangements being
examined and adjusted, where necessary, to optimize
the force for the CIED fight. An example is the traditional division of responsibility between U.S. Army
Engineers and Ordnance Corps personnel in the field
of Explosive Ordnance Disposal. This division was
reviewed in response to the shortage of personnel
available to deal with IED hazards, leading to the development of new skill sets within the Engineers.68 In
summary, the institutional response to the doctrinal
and training challenges of the IED threat was well underway in the U.S. Army by mid-2004, approximately
8 months after the index event.
Research and Development.
The U.S. R&D response to the IED threat began almost immediately, perhaps reflecting a U.S. military
predilection for technological solutions to problems.
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From an early stage, however, pundits and practitioners alike warned that a technological “silver bullet”
for the IED problem would be elusive at best, and that
the forces in contact could not afford to wait for it.
Nevertheless, technology was part of the answer and
the U.S. R&D establishment began to be harnessed
from an early stage, as reflected by General Abizaid’s
use of the Manhattan Project analogy to communicate
a sense of the problem’s R&D dimension. Technological responses were pursued across the spectrum of
CIED measures, including detection, protection, IED
defeat in the form of ECM and remote disposal, and
prevention in the form of the technical exploitation
of evidence to enable proactive network attack. Much
R&D was also devoted to technical ISR enhancements
to support all CIED measures. As understanding of
the IED threat spread, individuals and organizations
began the R&D of solutions independently.69
Institutionally, the importance of R&D was reflected in the structure of the JIEDDO and the bodies that
preceded it, all of which incorporated an element with
R&D responsibilities. In the JIEDDO, this is the JIEDD
Lab Board, which “coordinates, synchronizes, and
sponsors mid- and long-term research, development,
science, and technology that contribute to countering
the IED threat.”70
The evidence suggests that the IED threat constituted a less dangerous surprise to the U.S. R&D capacity than it did in other areas. There is little indication
that capacity was inadequate, qualitatively or quantitatively, and in need of expansion. Rather, available
capacity needed to be redirected, but this does not appear to have come at the expense of other R&D priorities.
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Industrial.
The U.S. industrial response to the IED threat is
best demonstrated by the effort to field rapidly large
numbers of protected vehicles. As discussed, this
manifested itself initially in orders for large numbers
of ASKs for HMMWVs, then matured into the MRAP
effort. At first, the United States had minimal capacity
to produce the necessary armor kits or vehicles and industrial capacity needed to expand significantly. One
company, Force Protection Inc., had obtained licenses
to produce a limited number of mine-protected Buffalo vehicles for the IVMMD project, but the design
of the vehicle’s V-shaped hull was based on South
African research. High-performance steel for MRAP
armor was a particular shortfall. Initially, U.S. capacity to produce this domestically was very limited,
and supplies for MRAP production needed to be deconflicted with other Defense projects.71 Some steel
needed to be imported, involving a waiver of normal
policy on the use of foreign materials.72 In response to
the demand created by the MRAP orders, the four U.S.
steel mills capable eventually of producing such steel
made “capital investments and process improvements
that enabled a 100 percent increase (in) . . . production capacity.”73 This is evidence of the U.S. industrial
base adjusting to the unexpected demand for a new
military platform. The initial paucity of the industrial
base is also demonstrated by the need to spread procurement over a number of manufacturers and vehicle
types, including overseas suppliers. This led to a diversified fleet that significantly complicates the logistical sustainment of the capability, a situation normally
avoided in deliberate procurement decisions. In this
case, the urgency of the requirement left the DoD with
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no option—further evidence of the degree to which
the U.S. military industrial base was surprised.74
Funding.
The allocation of funding specifically to address
the IED threat is a useful metric for the scale of the
U.S. response to it, although difficult to track accurately over the entire period since 2003, due to the diverse
application of funds. Prior to the emergence of the
threat, virtually no funding was allocated specifically
to it.75 The first institutional response, the U.S. Army’s
small IED Task Force, was initially funded in late2003, with U.S. $20 million from the Army’s budget.76
Specific appropriations began in 2004, with U.S. $100
million.77 Since its creation, the JIEDDO has had its
own funding line, with a base budget of U.S. $500 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, but also including
significant supplemental appropriations that brought
the total budget to U.S. $4.4 billion in 2009. By late2008, JIEDDO had spent about U.S. $16 billion.78 This
must be added to the funds allocated to specific CIED
programs, such as the MRAP, which totaled U.S. $22.7
billion by mid-2009.79
The funding allocated by the United States to
CIED measures is impressive, but two aspects are particularly relevant to this analysis. First, the funding
was not obligated in 2003, a clear indication that the
IED threat was not anticipated. Second, there are indications that the JIEDDO’s budget will be rolled into
DoD’s baseline funding, with responsibility for development and procurement of specific equipment, such
as ECM jammers, migrating to parent Services.80 This
would indicate a maturing of the response, insofar as
it becomes part of DoD’s business as usual, without
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requiring a custom-made organization to manage it.
This is a strong indication that, for the U.S. DoD, the
IED surprise response cycle is closing.
Policy.
An implicit U.S. policy response can be detected in
the establishment and robust funding of the JIEDDO
from 2005. This is reinforced explicitly in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which recognizes
surprise as an enduring characteristic of the contemporary security environment and cites the creation of
JIEDDO as an example of DoD’s agility in support of
operations.81 The 2006 QDR is overshadowed, however, by the policy response that has evolved since
the appointment of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. Gates's public statements since early-2007 are
evidence of a conscious decision to elevate the priority
of CIED capability development over existing conventional capability requirements. The relative fortunes
of the MRAP program and the F-22 Raptor Project
under Gates's incumbency are a materiel reflection of
this policy shift, which is also articulated concisely in
the 2010 QDR and in the official statements accompanying the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget submissions.82
Summary Assessment.
The evidence suggests that the emergence of the
IED threat in Iraq was a dangerous surprise for the U.S.
military, necessitating a response of national proportions with military, industrial, scientific, and budgetary dimensions. That response is still evolving more
than 6 years after the index event. Recognition of the
surprise was reasonably prompt, but initially the DoD
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attempted to cope with the problem by adapting existing resources, structures and processes, in addition to
tactical responses. A coordinated national response to
the threat, with its attendant management structures,
took approximately 2.5 years to develop. Even then,
key aspects of the DoD response, such as the MRAP
requirement, were not triggered until much later and
were influenced heavily by external perspectives, such
as that brought by a new Secretary of Defense. Indeed,
Congress was openly critical of the U.S. Army’s slowness in addressing the troops’ IED protection needs.83
Once the strategic leadership was provided, the DoD
began to respond more adroitly: for example, it adopted nonstandard and relatively risky procurement
strategies for necessary equipment. The appearance
of a deliberate policy shift in favor of CIED capabilities in public documents coincided with this change in
strategic leadership.
There are indications that the U.S. response cycle
is now closing. Measures to deal with IED threats
are increasingly seen as business as usual, with their
management moving toward more normal organizational and budgetary arrangements, such as baseline
funding, while the attendant military capabilities are
finding their place in everyday doctrine, training,
and equipment fleets. This cycle has occurred in the
context of a war of discretion, in which U.S. national
survival was not threatened. U.S. military casualties
in that war, although appalling and the highest since
Vietnam, have also been historically low (a tiny fraction of those incurred in Vietnam). This may have prolonged the U.S. response cycle, compared with what
may have been possible against a threat of national
extinction or even higher casualties. Given the political importance of success in Iraq, it is hard to conceive
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a lack of urgency. Accordingly, the U.S. response suggests that: recognition of surprise by senior leaders,
and their effective engagement in dealing with it, is
a major determinant of the speed of institutional response;84 conventional defense establishments may
not be good at responding to strategic surprises in
wars of discretion, and special arrangements may be
necessary to kick start an agile response; and, depending on the effectiveness of senior leadership, it may
take the United States about 5-6 years to respond completely to a strategic military surprise during a war of
discretion.
THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ
Australia’s involvement in the current Iraq conflict
was small in comparison with that of the United States.
It began with Special Forces and air operations during
the invasion of April-May 2003 prior to the emergence
of the IED threat, then shrank to a number of niche
contributions except for the period April 2005–June
2008, when a mounted battle group was deployed
to the British-led region in Iraq’s south.85 Australian
troops on the ground in Iraq never exceeded 800, and
many of these spent most of their time inside secure
bases with limited exposure to IED hazards.86 The
only remaining Australian military presence is a detachment providing security to Australia’s diplomatic
mission, the SECDET, and two individuals seconded
to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. At
the time of the writing of this manuscript, Australian
forces have suffered no combat fatalities in Iraq, but a
number of personnel have been wounded. The most
significant injuries were from IED attacks.87
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Throughout Australia's involvement in Iraq, its
military contributions have been characterized by a
high degree of discretion and selectivity as to their
size, capabilities, location, duties, and timing. With the
exception of the Overwatch Battle Group in the south,
most missions allowed Australians to avoid exposure
to high IED risks.88 The largest number of exposed personnel, members of the battle group, operated in an
area that experienced very low levels of IED activity,
compared with the most dangerous areas where large
numbers of U.S. forces operated, such as the Sunni Triangle. The relatively small and discretionary nature of
Australia’s commitments allowed the maintenance
of high levels of force protection for most personnel,
such as the almost exclusive use of protected vehicles
for ground movement after 2003.
THE AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE
Little information on Australia’s initial response to
the IED threat in Iraq is available from open sources.
Given the limited exposure of most personnel to such
risks until mid-2005, it is likely that tactical responses
were adequate for much of that time and operational
security concerns would preclude the publication of
those responses in detail. Institutional responses became visible later, giving the false impression that
Australia had been doing little about the threat until
then.
Recognition.
It is difficult to identify the point at which the ADO
recognized that it had been surprised by the IED threat
in Iraq. Recognition may have been complicated or de-
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layed by the small number of Australians in Iraq when
the threat emerged, most of whom had little exposure
to IED hazards.89 Tactical responses probably occurred
immediately, consistent with normal military behavior, but those responses would have little visibility in
open sources. Recognition that the Baghdad environment remained dangerous into mid-2003 is indicated
by the decision to equip the SECDET with armored
vehicles—an unusual means of diplomatic transport—
but such would have been a reasonable response to
a small arms threat as well as IEDs. References to the
IED threat to Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel do not appear in official statements until 2004, although they have been frequent since 2006. While it is
difficult to discern the point at which Australia recognized that the IED threat in Iraq constituted a strategic
or operational surprise demanding an appropriate response, it is reasonable to conclude that such recognition was considerably slower than that of the United
States and did not occur before 2005.
Institutional Response.
Just as Australian recognition of the IED surprise
was slow, so was the institutional response to it. That
response is described below, using the same criteria as
for the United States.
Organizational.
The ADO’s first publicly visible organizational
change in response to the IED threat occurred in February 2005, when a team of six specialists deployed
to Baghdad to participate in the U.S.-led Combined
Explosives Exploitation Cell, a technical intelligence
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organization established in late-2003 to do technical
exploitation of evidence from IED incidents in order
to cue action against insurgent IED cells.90 A secondary purpose for the CEXC contribution was to bring
advanced IED exploitation skills back to Australia.91
The ADO appears to have maintained that commitment until Australian troops withdrew finally in 2009.
Subsequent changes occurred in early-2006, with the
establishment of the ADF’s Counter IED Task Force
(CIEDTF) under a one-star commander. This was
followed almost immediately by the establishment,
within the Army, of an Explosive Hazards Centre
(ExHC), responsible for the delivery of IED-specific
training.92 No further organizational changes were evident publicly during the period of ADF deployments
to Iraq. While it is obvious that IED threats have heavily influenced the task-organization of ADF elements
deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan,93 there has been no
evidence of any long-term force structure changes to
deployable ADF elements to address that threat until the establishment of an Army Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) Squadron in late-2010 (well after the
ADF had left Iraq).94 Organizationally, the ADF has
largely made do with existing structures in response
to the IED threat.
The ADF’s most significant organizational changes
in response to the IED threat occurred after the appointment of Air Chief Marshall “Angus” Houston as
Chief of Defence Force (CDF) in mid-2005; the CIEDTF
was raised at his direction.95 CDF sources also reveal
more frequent public references to the IED threat after
Houston’s appointment, even prior to the ADF’s first
IED fatality, in Afghanistan in October 2007. Reporting of IED incidents affecting ADF elements has often
included reference to the CIEDTF as evidence of the
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ADF’s efforts to counter the threat. This suggests a
higher awareness of the IED threat coinciding with a
change in CDF—a noteworthy possibility, given the
new perspective that Houston brought to the situation.
Equipment.
The ADO’s most significant response to the IED
threat, in terms of equipment, is the inclusion of protected vehicles in all combat elements deploying to
Iraq and their almost exclusive use for movement outside the wire since 2004. The most obvious example of
this has been the use of the Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV), which first deployed with the
AMTG in April 2005 to perform the same role as the
U.S. MRAP. Unlike the MRAP, the PMV was not newly acquired in response to the IED threat; its procurement had been underway since at least 1994 as part
of a land force capability requirement for “defence of
Australia” scenarios.96 The materiel solution to that
requirement—the Bushmaster—had been selected in
1999 but had not entered service fully when the AMTG
requirement arose. PMVs were rushed into use in Iraq
ahead of the deliberate introduction-into-service (IIS)
schedule. This involved some risk, as logistic sustainment systems were not mature and personnel were
not experienced in the vehicles’ employment. Readiness to take that risk shows some agility in response to
surprise. The ready availability of a materiel solution
could also be evidence of sound force development
processes that had anticipated the threat; equally, it
could be serendipitous, like the Bushmaster, which
was developed for another purpose. Although precise
figures are not publicly available, the photographic
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and budgetary record suggests that the number of
PMVs deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan rose steadily
over the next few years, and that they have undergone
rapid improvements in response to new requirements
identified on operations.97 Additional PMVs are also
being procured to meet other vehicle requirements,
suggesting that the need for protection is now appreciated much more widely than previously, perhaps
due to the IED experience.98
While the employment of the PMV, especially by
units not normally issued with them, suggests some
adaptation in response to surprise, it does not compare with the U.S. MRAP program in the level of ministerial push, procedural innovation, or new funding
required. Australia simply did not need to initiate a
proportionate industrial response from a cold start, as
the United States did. It is uncertain whether Australia would have been capable of doing so. It is more
likely that, in the absence of the Bushmaster, it would
have sought to acquire an alternative vehicle overseas.
Given the tight world market for such vehicles, this
would probably have delayed or severely constrained
ADF contributions to Iraq.
Other Australian equipment responses to the
IED threat are difficult to discern, although there is
evidence of significant funding for other CIED equipment requirements from 2007 onward.99 It must be presumed that ECM and other best-practice capabilities
employed by other nations have been fielded by the
ADF.100 Defence has attracted some criticism over the
slow fielding of CIED equipment, although this has
largely been inspired by fatal incidents in Afghanistan
since 2007, rather than in Iraq.101
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Training and Doctrine.
Australia’s training and doctrine response to the
IED surprise has been generally tactical, with most
emphasis on the pre-deployment training of forces
deploying into the theater, culminating in elaborate
Mission Rehearsal Exercises. The first institutional
training response visible publicly is the commencement of Explosive Hazard Awareness and Protection
Trainer (EHAPT) courses within the Army’s Training
Command in July 2008, the first new CIED training
delivered as part of the ADF’s normal raise-train-andsustain processes.102
The ADO’s doctrine has yet to demonstrate much
publicly discernible change in response to the IED
challenge. Similarly, articles and debate on IEDs in the
various professional journals have been limited. They
were virtually nonexistent before 2005 and sparse until 2008.103 While not publicly available for security reasons, presumably doctrine has existed to support the
EHAPT since 2008. Given that the IED threat emerged
in 2003, the ADO’s institutional training and doctrine
responses appear slow.
Research and Development.
There is little evidence of a major shift in Australia’s
R&D efforts in response to the IED threat, although
Defence’s relatively exclusive expertise in such areas
as explosive technology and ECM would suggest that
the Department’s R&D agencies are heavily involved
in such work.104 The absence of major budgetary changes or organizational shifts within the Defence Science
and Technology Organisation (DSTO) would suggest
that it is absorbing additional work within existing re-
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sources and, consequently, that the R&D response has
not reached strategic proportions.
Industrial.
Australia’s response to the IED threat has not
had a significant industrial dimension. Although the
emergence of the threat has led to orders for additional Bushmaster vehicles, these have not demanded any
significant expansion in industrial capacity.105
Funding.
Defence required additional funding in response
to the IED threat, some of it in the form of budget supplementation for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
under no-win, no-loss arrangements. While impossible to isolate in the published budget data, it is likely
that the operating costs of IED-related requirements,
especially PMVs, have added significantly to the level
of operational supplementation. Further IED costs
have been absorbed within Defence’s normal budget,
with inevitable impacts on other priorities: this includes AU$40 million approved specifically for CIED
equipment in 2009-10. This equipment is for Operation
SLIPPER (Afghanistan), and therefore not in response
to the IED threat in Iraq, but is significant as one of
the few published examples of expenditure on CIED
requirements. It is also significant that this was an additional budget measure, outside the deliberate budget process, supporting the assessment of surprise.106
The IED threat has also contributed to other unforeseen requirements, such as urgent enhancements to
PMVs.107 In the 2010 budget, specific provision for
CIED funding appeared for the first time as part of a
AU$1.1 Billion package of force protection enhancements.108 Given the diversity of funding arrangements,
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it is difficult to attribute accurately specific amounts to
all Australian CIED efforts, but the funding impacts of
the surprise are significant in Australian terms.109
Policy.
There is little evidence of a policy dimension in
Australia’s response to the IED threat before 2010. With
the exception of the funding decisions of unforeseen
expenditures, IEDs seem to have caused no changes
to the direction of existing Defence policy. The 2009
Defence White Paper makes no mention of IEDs, nor of
the notion of surprise as it is considered here.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES
The starkest difference between the U.S. and Australian handling of the IED threat in Iraq is the time
taken to recognize the surprise and initiate an institutional response. As Figure 3 indicates, the first indication of an Australian institutional response—the
deployment of the CEXC contingent—came a full 15
months later than that of the United States, despite
having troops deployed to the same theater, at the
same time, and with access to the same threat data.
An equivalent response, the creation of a dedicated
task force to begin dealing with the problem, took
Australia 28 months longer than the United States.
Continuing through to the implementation of an institutional training response, Australia took a full 5 years
from the emergence of the IED threat in mid-2003 to
the delivery of the first EHAPT course, and this was
after substantial combat forces had been withdrawn
from Iraq. Compared with the 30 to 36 months that the
United States took to perform the same actions, Aus-

37

tralia’s institutional response to the IED threat seems
remarkably slow.
U.S. and Australian responses also manifested
themselves differently in terms of the balance between
the elements of the institutional response. The U.S. reaction featured significant material acquisitions, with
major industrial and funding implications. In comparison, Australia’s response emphasized organizational
and training measures.
Given the relative sizes of the U.S. and Australian
defense organizations, the slowness of the Australian
response is counterintuitive: a small organization
should be more agile than a larger one. Other factors
must account for the relative speed of each country’s
reaction. The different balance between the elements
of institutional response must also be explained. The
reasons for these things lie in:
• the timing of leadership changes;
• the perceptions of the threat to respective national interests and equities, including the
number of personnel at risk; and,
• judgments as to the adequacy of existing response options.
Leadership Changes.
The significance of strategic leadership changes
lies in the extent to which they bring fresh perspectives to the problem and reduce affinities with existing
solutions. In both the United States and Australia, the
changes that most characterize the overall response
were initiated by a newly appointed strategic leader, respectively, Secretary of Defense Gates with the
MRAP Program, and Chief of Defence Force Houston
with the CIEDTF. In both cases, institutional respons-
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es were already underway when the new leader arrived, but their direction changed significantly once
that person became familiar with the problem. Both
individuals were also new to the organizational problem space: Gates was an intelligence specialist, and
his recent experience in the Iraq Study Group gave
him excellent threshold knowledge of the problems in
Iraq, but he was not a Defense insider. Houston was
an Air Force officer looking at a land force problem
that hitherto had only been addressed by land operations experts. As such, it is possible that neither was
influenced by orthodoxies—born of conventional doctrine and traditional TTPs and structures—that limited
conceptualization of the problem and its appropriate
response. Similarly, neither had preexisting personal
equities in the way the land force contribution in Iraq
had evolved. This may have allowed more freedom to
consider alternatives.
In both the U.S. and Australian cases, it is significant that institutional responses had commenced prior
to the appointment of the new leader, but they had not
yet adopted their decisive characteristic, especially in
terms of scale. This suggests that recognition of surprise is not dependent on a fresh perspective in the
first instance, but a new outlook or especially acute
powers of insight may assist realization of its full extent or implications, and consequently, the identification of the right response.110 Firm conclusions to this
effect are impossible without detailed knowledge of
the decisionmaking process followed by each country, but the personal impact of new strategic leaders
in both countries suggests that leadership has an important role in the comprehensive appreciation of surprise and is therefore a key determinant of the tempo
of the institutional response cycle.
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A change in leadership does not explain why Australia’s initial institutional response, the deployment
of the CEXC contingent, lagged the U.S. formation of
the Army IED Task Force by 15 months. The justification for such a measure was the same in October 2003
as it was in February 2005.
National Interests and Equities.
The United States led the invasion of Iraq and was
the undisputed leader of the Coalition fighting the
insurgency until 2009. That leadership role, and the
political necessity of guaranteeing success in the conflict, meant that it could neither avoid any aspect of
the fight nor stint on the resources it must commit. Although not a war of national survival, for the United
States the Iraqi insurgency has been much less a war
of discretion than for most of its Coalition partners.
Thus, the United States could not reduce its exposure
to threats such as IEDs, raising the urgency of finding an effective response to them. The mounting U.S.
casualty figures reinforce this point. By comparison,
Australia had far less at stake in Iraq, and consequentially, enjoyed broad discretion in the size and nature
of its commitment. This allowed Australia to mitigate
risk substantially and largely explains the complete
absence of Australian IED fatalities. Consequently,
an institutional response had no urgency for Australia initially. Although unsatisfying intellectually, this
explanation may partly explain Australia’s slow response. A corollary conclusion, however, is that the
delayed response meant that Australian troops began
to benefit from improved CIED measures 15 months
later than they might have—a disappointing reflection
on Australia’s Defence establishment.
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Adequacy of Existing Capabilities.
Another factor driving the urgency of a response
to a capability-based surprise might be the size of the
capability gap created. Such gaps have quantitative
and qualitative dimensions. A quantitative gap exists
when the surprised force possesses the elements of the
necessary response, but not enough of them. A qualitative one exists when the surprised force is outclassed
by the adversary’s new capability, without necessarily
being outnumbered. In the U.S. case, the absence of a
capability like the MRAP constituted a large qualitative gap, while the size of the force exposed to IED
hazards automatically meant that the gap was also
huge quantitatively. This capability gap manifested itself immediately in the scale of casualties suffered by
the United States. The United States thus confronted a
major problem, necessitating an urgent response.
By comparison, Australia had a much smaller force
exposed, especially when the threat first emerged; it
could minimize its exposure to that threat by being
highly selective about the size of forces deployed, the
roles they performed, and the timing of commitments;
and in the PMV it had on hand a solution to the most
pressing equipment deficiency, in sufficient quantities
for the forces it needed to deploy. These factors shrank
the capability gap and therefore reduced the urgency
of an institutional response, but they do not explain
fully why its initiation was delayed until 2005-06,
when the factors that demanded it had existed since
late-2003.
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COUNTERVAILING ASSESSMENTS
As with any assessment based on a small sample of
cases, firm conclusions on cause and effect are risky. In
the interests of balance, it is important to consider alternative interpretations. Three of these are discussed
below.
Conventional Thinking.
While a conventional military background could
inhibit the recognition of surprise or limit response
options by creating narrow orthodox perspectives,
that effect is not demonstrated consistently. General John Abizaid, whose Manhattan Project memo
sparked the U.S. institutional response, saw almost
immediately that he had a game-changing problem:
Abizaid was a career soldier from an infantry background, as was Australia’s previous Defence chief. A
number of key innovators had similarly conventional
backgrounds. While it seems clear that leadership is a
critical requirement for agile responses to surprise, it
is less certain, based on the two examples considered,
that a conventional background necessarily leads to
leadership orthodoxies that impede agile responses,
especially at the military level.
Adequate Agility.
While Australia’s recognition of operational surprise and its consequent institutional response seem
worryingly slow, they pass an empirical test of adequacy in that Australia suffered no fatalities and very
few casualties in Iraq from IEDs. Indeed, the institutional response was well under way before the first
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IED fatality in Afghanistan.111 By these measures, the
ADO could be assessed as adequately responsive.
Such an assessment, however, would need to discount
luck as a factor in Australia’s fatality-free record. This
seems unreasonable, given that Coalition partners operating similar equipment in Iraq in the same areas at
the same time suffered catastrophic IED attacks. There
is no doubt that the training, TTPs, and equipment of
the ADF elements were major factors in their success,
but most of these fall into the tactical-response category. Judgments about the adequacy of the ADO’s institutional CIED response in Iraq need to be tempered
with reasonable skepticism.
Flexible Force Structure.
In Iraq, both U.S. and Australian forces needed protected mobility in the form of a purpose-built armored
truck that neither had fielded previously. To do so, the
United States needed to embark on a massive coldstart acquisition program to equip its forces with the
MRAP: Australia did not, instead accelerating slightly
the fielding of the PMV, which was already in the acquisition pipeline. This could be argued, optimistically, as a demonstration of the prescience of Australia’s
force development process and the inherent flexibility of its force structure. Given that the PMV was acquired to meet a very different requirement, however,
it could be interpreted equally as luck. Nevertheless,
the Australian response passes another empirical, and
comparative, test of adequacy in the fact that the Al
Mutthana Task Group (AMTG) deployed to Al Mutthana, Iraq, in 2005 with its PMVs, while U.S. troops
in Iraq waited a further 2 years for their equivalent.
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Failure to Anticipate and the Risk of Overreaction.
Military professional literature and defense documents show that both the United States and Australia
had begun to contemplate threats like IEDs well before the invasion of Iraq. With the exception of dedicated management structures, such as JIEDDO and
the CIEDTF, virtually all elements of the response that
eventually manifested itself existed before 2003. It
could be said that, by not pursuing a CIED capability
in anticipation of the IED threat, both countries chose
to be surprised by it. Such a course, however, would
have brought its own risks.
Compared with other areas of government spending, defense budgets are large, but they are finite, especially in nominal peacetime. Judgments on investment in expensive, long-term capability projects must
be made carefully because, once made, these commitments severely limit discretion to pursue other capabilities for years. Expensive capability projects, however,
tend to be those that address the worst threats, those
that threaten national survival. They secure the ability
to win wars of necessity, rather than wars of discretion. Failure to make timely investment decisions can
lead to capability gaps that cannot be made up in time
to meet rising threats—leading to calamitous strategic
vulnerability in the future.112 On the other hand, failure to win today’s wars, even if they do not threaten
national survival, can lead to the fall of governments
and the slow erosion of our agreeable way of life.
The dilemma facing modern militaries, therefore,
is to balance their efforts and investment between the
capabilities needed to win today’s wars and those es-
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sential to win tomorrow’s. As the cost of high-end military capabilities rises, these judgments are becoming
more critical and more difficult. Secretary of Defense
Gates's decisions to channel funding into the MRAP
program, while severely restricting the scope of the
F-22 Raptor fighter acquisition, is a case in point.
Overinvestment in an acute capability gap that proves
to be an aberration, however debilitating at the time,
could leave a nation fatally exposed in a cataclysmic
state-on-state contest. Failing to address the gap and
losing the war, however small, could bring down the
government in the near term. This dilemma is a major
theme in contemporary defense policy and academic
literature.113
This suggests that, in an era when warfare may be
dominated by “small,” intra-state conflicts and insurgencies, national defense establishments could be best
served by maintaining those capabilities needed to
defend against threats to national survival and optimizing their ability to respond to dangerous surprises
as they arise.114
The Focusing Power of Casualties.
A striking feature of the U.S. experience is the way
the escalating institutional responses in the building
of the JIEDDO closely followed significant spikes in
IED fatalities, and their cumulative growth. In Australia’s case, with no fatalities in Iraq, the proximate
stimuli for institutional responses are harder to determine. Australia appears to have watched the mounting U.S. deaths for some time before deciding that the
IED phenomenon was not an isolated aberration and
required an institutional response. This suggests that
casualties, and especially fatalities, concentrate the
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minds of defense leaders and politicians and may be
the decisive metric by which the adequacy of evolving responses is gauged. This is not counterintuitive,
but it poses the risk that a nation that is able to avoid
casualties by a combination of selective participation
and luck could delude itself as to the enduring nature
of a surprise threat and therefore miss an opportunity
to develop its response, leaving itself open to further,
more serious, surprise in the future.
SUBSEQUENT EXPERIENCE—AFGHANISTAN
IEDs have been endemic in Afghanistan for more
than 20 years.115 Their use against Coalition forces has
been increasing since 2006, and they have been the
principal cause of fatalities for some time.116 To meet
this threat, the United States is increasing the flow of
MRAPs to troops in Afghanistan and has commenced
deliveries of MATVs.117 To encourage Coalition participation in the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), the United States is providing MRAPs to its
Coalition partners.118 This indicates that both the United States and its partners have again been surprised
by the IED threat.
Given the recent experience in Iraq, a second surprise is difficult to explain: intuitively, a technique that
had proven so useful in one contemporary insurgency
should have been expected to appear in another, especially a technique that is well known, due to its high
media profile, and one that is relatively simple, technically speaking. While the shortage of MRAPs is evidence of surprise, it does not necessarily indicate slow
recognition of that surprise: rather, it signifies the extent of the materiel shortfall, in that the U.S. industrial
base has been unable so far to deliver the total number
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of vehicles required to support operations in both Iraq
and Afghanistan; Iraq has had priority. The current
draw down in Iraq may alleviate this problem.119
Australia’s experience in Afghanistan differs from
that in Iraq in several ways. Compared with Iraq, in
Afghanistan the ADF operates in more dangerous
areas, with far less discretion to avoid IED hazards.
Unlike in Iraq, in Afghanistan Australia has suffered
fatalities, IEDs being the principal cause. In public announcements about casualties, the ADF emphasizes
its significant CIED efforts, drawing attention to measures such as the CIEDTF. 120 To the ADF’s credit, much
of this was in place before the first fatality. Evidence of
unanticipated requirements, however, lies in the need
to seek additional funding for new CIED measures
after fatalities began to be suffered.121 While these requirements may not have completely blindsided the
ADF, they are evidence of operational surprise in so
far as the ADF was unable to meet those needs from
its force-in-being, even after 3 years at war. The U.S.
and Australian experience in Afghanistan suggests,
therefore, that both countries still see the IED threat as
an aberration, to be responded to when it arises, rather
than as a likely feature of the counterinsurgency battle
space, to be anticipated and prepared for. The next
war will demonstrate whether this is true.122
CONCLUSIONS
Surprise is an essential part of military operations;
defense professionals will always seek ways to inflict
it on their adversaries, and to recover quickly when
surprised themselves. When fighting the current insurgency in Iraq, the Coalition suffered an operational,
if not strategic, surprise in the form of the IED threat
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that emerged in the second half of 2003. To deal with
that surprise, both the United States and Australia
needed to make institutional responses in a cycle that
took at least 6 years. The subsequent impact of IEDs in
Afghanistan suggests, in fact, that the response is still
incomplete.
To constitute an operational surprise, a threat
based on a specific technique or capability need not
be completely novel, but merely unanticipated and
unanswerable without recourse to operational-level
capacities and resources and some change to institutional behavior. IEDs are not new, nor are the principal measures used to deal with them—protected
vehicles, disposal techniques, ISR, ECM, intelligence
fusion, etc.—yet neither the United States nor Australia was prepared for the threat that arose in Iraq. In
Australia’s case, the considerable discretion it enjoyed
in the size and nature of its Iraq involvement appears
to have significantly reduced the urgency of an institutional response, and may have delayed the recognition of surprise in the first instance.
Given their scale and complexity, institutional responses to operational surprises can be time consuming to implement. To minimize their impact, it is critical that surprises be recognized quickly and responses
initiated swiftly, especially for those in contact. Strategic leaders have a crucial role in the recognition
of operational surprise and in directing institutional
responses. Professional orthodoxies, limited perspectives, and equities in the status quo can delay these
decisions, impacting responsiveness. It may take the
appointment of new leadership to achieve the necessary impetus in the recovery. For both the United
States and Australia, a comprehensive response to the
IED surprise took some years to evolve and then only
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after changes in senior leadership. In Australia’s case,
there was an inexplicable delay of 15 months before
the first institutional adaptation was made. Although
this delay did not appear to contribute to casualties,
it is a disturbing reflection on the ADO’s agility. This
is not to say that the ADO was not responding to the
situation at hand, but perhaps that it was not contemplating how that situation might deteriorate without a
timely and bold response.
Many predict that the international security environment over the next few decades will be dominated
by irregular warfare in intrastate conflicts and insurgencies. In such an environment, adversaries will
seek asymmetric advantages over conventional forces
by confronting them with unanticipated threats. If
this proves true, further dangerous surprises can be
expected unless the new threats are predicted and
prepared for. The range of potential surprises is very
broad, however, and it is unlikely that every candidate threat will eventuate. Attempting to address every possible surprise in advance could consume a nation’s defense budget, yet amount to little more than
“dancing at shadows” while important conventional
capabilities deteriorate through underinvestment. In
such an environment, there is a strong case for relying on institutional agility to respond to surprises, by
recognizing and recovering from them quickly. This
is risky, but there may be little alternative. To mitigate the risk, national defense establishments should
pursue ways to optimize their responsiveness to surprises. A good first step would be to support senior
leaders with the processes needed to recognize and
respond to operational surprises when they arise.
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